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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN E. MAXFIELD, as Guardian ad Litem for LAURIE ANN
MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
KENNETH 0. FISHLER,
Defendant and Respondent.

1
J
/
I
/
\
J

Case No.
13955

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of
the alleged failure of the respondent physician to discover and treat a physical ailment of the appellant infant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, presiding, dismissed the appellant's
claim for failure to prosecute.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has failed to state important facts relevant to this appeal and a more complete and accurate
statement is therefore necessary. The parties will hereinafter be designated as they appeared in the trial court.
The facts relating to the merits of the plaintiff's
claim are not in issue on this appeal and can be briefly
summarized. The plaintiff's child, Laurie Ann Maxfield,
was born under the care of an obstetrician on December 10, 1967, in the Latter-day Saints Hospital in Salt
Lake City. [E. 25] Laurie's mother arranged for the
defendent pediatrician, Dr. Kenneth Fishier, to begin
caring for the infant after her birth and Dr. Fishier
examined her on December 10, 1967. [E. 28]. The initial examination revealed nothing remarkable and, during the next three years, Dr. Fishier occasionally examined the child and treated her for various ailments.
[E.28].
In August, 1970, the plaintiff informed Dr. Fishier
that the child was having to urinate with unusual frequency. Dr. Fishier examined a urine specimen which
was found to be normal, but, when the problem persisted, he referred the plaintiff to a urologist, Dr. Paul
Clark. Dr. Clark diagnosed a partially constricted
urethra and admitted the child to the Primary Children's
Hospital for a urethrotomy. At the time of surgery,
Dr. Clark observed that the child's labia were fused
together and only a small pinpoint opening allowed
urine to pass. [B. 21]. A labiaplasty was performed
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and the dilation procedure of the urethra was then completed without complication. [E. 21].
On October 18, 1972, the plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging that Dr. Fishier was negligent in failing to observe the adherent labia and that the delay in correcting the condition caused the subsequent urethral hypoplasia, as well as other physical and emotional damage.
[E. 110], The complaint was served on October 23, 1972.
[E.106].
On November 13, 1972, the defendant answered the
complaint and, since the plaintiff resided in Arizona,
the defendant filed a notice requiring security for costs
pursuant to Eule 12(j), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure.
[E. 101-103]. The plaintiff failed to file a bond within
one month as required by Eule 12(j) and, on December
26, 1972, the defendant moved for a dismissal. [E.
99-100]. The court ordered the plaintiff to file a bond
by January 3, 1973, but, subject to compliance with its
order, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
[E. 98]. The record contains no evidence or indication
that the plaintiff filed a security for costs in accordance
with the court's order.
On January 9, 1973, the defendant filed a notice
for the taking of the plaintiff's deposition. [E. 96]. Mr.
Fullmer objected to the date of the scheduled deposition
and, at his request, the deposition was rescheduled and
taken on January 25, 1975 [E. 93-95].
On March 14, 1974, after the plaintiff had failed to
take any action on the case for more than a year, the
3
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defendant submitted interrogatories and requested a
trial setting in order to move the case forward. [R. 87,
90-92], Mr. Fullmer objected to the interrogatories on
the grounds that he had insufficient time in which to
answer and objected to the request for a trial setting
on the grounds that discovery had not been completed.
[R. 88-89]. Neither objection was noticed for hearing
and a trial date was set for October 29, 1974. [R. 87.5].
The plaintiff answered the interrogatories two months
later on May 16, 1974, although the answers were not
filed until October 24, 1974. [R. 72-73]. ,
Supplemental interrogatories were submitted to the
plaintiff on May 20, 1974. [R. 84-86]. After waiting
nearly five months for the plaintiff to supply answers,
defendant moved for an order compelling discovery on
October 18, 1974, eleven days prior to trial. [R. 77].
Mr. Fullmer failed to appear at the hearing and the
court ordered that answers to the supplemental interrogatories be filed no later than October 24, 1974, or
the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. [R. 74]. The
plaintiff submitted answers on October 24, 1974. [R.
69-71].
On the morning of trial, the plaintiff's counsel and
the infant's parents were present, as were the defendant
and his attorney. [R. 13]. Just prior to commencement
of the jury trial, Mr. Fullmer requested a conference
with the Court and counsel in chambers. [R. 13]. Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that he had hoped to
present medical evidence concerning the condition and
care of the child through the testimony of the urologist,
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who had treated her four years earlier. [R. 13]. Plaintiff's counsel had attempted to serve Dr. Clark with
a subpoena four days prior to the trial, but Dr. Clark
was then out of town and would not return in time to
testify. [R. 13]. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that he had
not contacted any other medical witnesses and none was
present for trial to testify concerning the medical community's standard of care for treatment in such cases
and the child's current condition and prognosis. [R. 13].
The plaintiff's counsel therefore moved for a continuance. [R. 13].
r Upon inquiry by the court, plaintiff's counsel admitted that he had never contacted Dr. Clark to arrange
his testimony nor had he notified him of the scheduled
trial date. [R. 14]. He had also made no effort to
secure the attendance of physicians in Arizona who had
treated the child. [R. 14].
The court asked plaintiff's counsel for an offer of
proof of the testimony he expected Dr. Clark to give.
Plaintiff's counsel conceded that Dr. Clark had previously expressed the opinion to him that Dr. Fishier
had done nothing wrong, but claimed the plaintiff would
testify that Dr. Clark had made contrary statements to
her after the corrective surgery. [R. 14]. Plaintiff's
counsel also informed the court that the child's parents
were prepared to testify to the damage they had personally suffered by having to render additional care to
the child. [R. 14]. When the court informed plaintiff's
counsel that the child's parents were not parties to the
lawsuit, he then moved for leave to amend his complaint.
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[R. 14]. Plaintiff's counsel made no other offer of proof
to support his motion for a continuance.
The court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint to add additional parties because the motion,
made on the morning of trial, came too late. [R. 14].
The court also determined that the plaintiff's counsel
had failed to demonstrate due diligence and had failed
to offer sufficient proof to justify a postponement of
the trial and, therefore, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a continuance. [R. 15].
r

Since plaintiff's counsel had failed to secure the
attendance of any expert to testify on the plaintiff's behalf, the plaintiff could not present evidence needed to
prevail and, therefore, could not proceed with the trial.
Even though the defendant was fully prepared to proceed, since plaintiff's counsel had failed to exercise due
diligence in preparing for the trial and had failed to
take any reasonable measures to bring the case to a
conclusion during the pendency of the case, the defendant moved the court for an order dismissing plaintiff's
claim for failure to prosecute. [R. 14].
The court found that the files and records of the
case indicated that plaintiff's counsel had undertaken
no discovery by deposition, interrogatories or otherwise,
that he had been consistently dilatory in responding
to discovery requests of the defendant and that he had
failed to make reasonable efforts to prepare for trial
to the detriment of the defendant who was ready to proceed. [R. 13-14]. Based on these findings, the court
6
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dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute
in accordance with Eule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 15].
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IS PRESUMED
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
UNLESS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS
SHOWN.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim in
accordance with the discretionary authority vested in
the trial judge by Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states, in its relevant part:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him.
This Court, in harmony with courts throughout the country, recognizes that the trial judge exercising such discretionary power is presumed to have acted reasonably
and his decision will not be disturbed unless the record
reveals abuse of discretion.
In Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the trial judge on his own
motion dismissed a complaint and counterclaim for failure to prosecute. Quoting the opinion in Reed v. First
National Bank, 194 Or. 45, 241 P.2d 109 (1952), the Court
adopted the following rule :

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In dismissing an action for want of prosecution,
the court may proceed under the statute, or it
may, of its own motion, take action to that end.
In acting on its own motion, the court must proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from
the record that the court's discretion has been
abused. 461 P.2d at 464-65. (Emphasis omitted).
The appropriate standard of review in cases of discretionary dismissals was also discussed in the recent
case of Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974).
In Barber, the trial court granted a default judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs because the defendant failed to
respond to interrogatories. Conceding that the trial
court should exercise discretion liberally in favor of
giving parties an opportunity to a hearing on the merits,
the Court, nevertheless, correctly held:
In situations where the exercise of discretion is
appropriate, considerable weight should be given
to the determination of the trial court, whichever
way it goes. This is true because due to his close
involvement with the parties, the witnesses, and
the total circumstances of the case, he is in the
best position to judge what the interests of justice require in safeguarding the rights and interests of all parties concerned. 522 P.2d at 702.
Plaintiff cites Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243
P.2d 747 (1952) and Evcms v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272,
399 P.2d 210 (1965) in support of the proposition that
the Court should appraise a dismissal pursuant to Rule
41(b) in a light most favorable to the losing party.
This Court has consistently held to the contrary and
the cases plaintiff relies upon are wholly inapplicable
8
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to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In Martin and
Evans, the trial court granted a dismissal on the merits
because the evidence presented at trial indicated the
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent.
In contrast, the trial court in the instant case did
not weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claim, but merely
exercised discretionary power reserved exclusively to
the court. As stated in Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley,
16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), where the Court
sustained a dismissal for failing to cooperate in discovery procedures:
Unless it is shown that his action is without support in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be disturbed. 396 P.2d at 412.
Since the trial court's judgment is presumed to be
correct, the plaintiff had the burden of establishing an
abuse of discretion but has failed to do so.
POINT I I
THE TEIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE.
While it is the general policy of the Court to favor
an adjudication of the merits in each case, the concomitant interests of all parties in proceeding toward a conclusion with reasonable dispatch must be equally protected. The facts of the instant case, viewed in light of
precedent, clearly demonstrate that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion, but, rather, acted with judicial
propriety.
9
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The determination of whether the trial court abused
its discretion must, of course, ultimately depend upon
the facts of each case. Nevertheless, in States Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.
1970), cited with approval in plaintiff's brief, the Court
proposed a rule of thumb for judging the exercise of
discretion that the defendant offers to this Court for
its consideration. Citing the " oft-quoted" phrase of
Judge Magruder in In Re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182
(1st Cir. 1954), the Court stated:
[T]he exercise of discretion of the trial judge
should not be disturbed unless there is " a definite and firm conviction that the court below
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." 426 F.2d at 804.
The relevant factors suggested for consideration in
cases of dismissals under Rule 41(b) were enumerated
by the Court as follows:
(1) the appellants' right to a hearing on its
claim, (2) the impairment of appellees' defenses
presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the
wholesome policy of the law in favor of the
prompt disposition of lawsuits, and (4) the duty
of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.
Id. at 805.
In States Steamship, the court affirmed the dismissal of an action because the plaintiff failed for more
than 13 months to respond to the defendant's interrogatories. The facts of the case now before this Court,
viewed according to the above-cited standard, similarly
compel an affirmance of the trial court's decision to
dismiss.
10
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Implicit in Eule 41(b) is the duty of the plaintiff
to prosecute his case in due course and with reasonable
diligence. In the instant case, the plaintiff not only
failed to do so, but actually impeded the progress of
litigation at every step and, in the end, exposed a fatal
lack of preparedness that precluded any attempt to proceed on the day of trial.
The record discloses that after the complaint was
filed initiating this action, plaintiff's counsel made no
effort whatsoever to obtain evidence establishing a factual basis for the plaintiff's claim. No witnesses, experts or adverse parties were deposed. Plaintiff's counsel did not prepare interrogatories. Indeed, no medical experts were consulted to evaluate the propriety of
the defendant's medical care upon which the alleged
damages are based. If such experts had been consulted,
the claim against this defendant might have been voluntarily dismissed.
In addition to demonstrating the absence of any
effort to substantiate the merit of appellant's claim, the
record also discloses the plaintiff's resistance to defendant's efforts to move the case forward. The plaintiff refused to file the required undertaking for costs
upon the request to do so and an undertaking was filed,
if at all, only after a court order was issued. After the
defendant deposed the plaintiff's mother, the case remained dormant for a year until the defendant again
initiated action by filing interrogatories and a request
for a trial setting. Notwithstanding the passage of a
year since commencement of the action, the plaintiff
II
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resisted both efforts to encourage progress of the litigation. Plaintiff's counsel filed objections, but failed to
proceed even on his own objections and never requested
a hearing to resolve them. The answers to interrogatories were not filed within the time required by the
rules. Supplemental interrogatories remained unanswered for nearly five months until the defendant was
forced to seek an order compelling discovery six days
prior to trial.
^
The record thus demonstrates that plaintiff failed
within the time required by the Eules of Procedure to
respond to each and every discovery and procedural
effort put forth by the defendant.
On the morning of trial, the past neglect in failing
to prepare and prosecute the plaintiff's claim was fully
exposed. The plaintiff's counsel and the child's parents
were present, but no medical expert had been contacted,
interviewed, or subpoenaed for trial.
The plaintiff's counsel presumably knew that the
ordinary care and skill required of a doctor in the community in which he practices and proximate causation
of the injury alleged must necessarily be established
by expert testimony. Hug gins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233,
310 P.2d 523 (1957); Marsh v. Pernberton, 10 Utah 2d
40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959). In this case, the treatment
of the infant's ailment and its relationship, if any, to
the subsequent complication are not matters of common
knowledge to laymen and do not evidence gross neglect
or want of care and skill such as leaving medical sup12
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plies in the incision of a patient and therefore, expert
testimony of negligence and causation was essential to
the plaintiff's case.
Without expert testimony, since the plaintiff could
not introduce any competent evidence demonstrating
negligence or the extent of the damages, if any, proximately resulting from the doctor's treatment, the only
available alternative was to seek a continuance of the
trial.
The trial court could have granted a trial continuance in accordance with Rule 40(b), Utah Eules of
Civil Procedure, but it properly refused to do so. The
rule states, in its relevant part:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just . . .
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. / / the motion is made upon the ground
of the absence of evidence, such motion shall also
set forth the materiality of the evidence expected
to be obtained and shall show that due diligence
has been used to procure it. (Emphasis added).
Since plaintiff's counsel had never contacted or interviewed Dr. Clark, he was unable to offer competent
proof concerning the testimony he was expected to give.
More importantly, however, he could not show that due
diligence was used to procure Dr. Clark's testimony.
No explanation exists for the failure to interview Dr.
Clark or to notify him of the trial date or to subpoena
him prior to trial or to secure his deposition.
13
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Therefore, the trial court clearly did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for a continuance of
the trial date. The court could have allowed plaintiff
an opportunity to proceed with the scheduled trial, but
it correctly chose not to permit the needless waste of
judicial time and energy in pursuit of a futile endeavor.
Since the plaintiff could not prove a case in the absence
of expert testimony, the plaintiff's counsel's argument
on appeal that he was ready to proceed is wholly contrived and without merit.
When all relevant factors are considered, the record
of this case not only supports, but clearly dictates a
conclusion that the trial court properly dismissed the
plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the
case, but it was the defendant that made every effort
to allow the plaintiff that opportunity. The plaintiff
had two years to investigate and substantiate the allegations asserted in the complaint and had nearly six
months after knowledge of the trial date to prepare
the case for presentation to the jury. Nevertheless, the
record indicates that no action whatsoever was undertaken to prove a case and, as a result, the plaintiff was
incapable of proceeding on the date of trial. In contrast, the defendant initiated each and every discovery
and procedural step necessary to bring the case to trial
and the defense was fully prepared to proceed to the
jury. The court and the defendant did not deny the
plaintiff a reasonable opportunity for a hearing on the
merits. On the contrary, the plaintiff and plaintiff's
counsel forfeited that right by their own neglect.
U
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The cases plaintiff relies upon are, thus, wholly
distinguishable from the facts relevant to this appeal.
In McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc.,
17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966), the Court reversed
a default judgment entered by the court when the defendants' counsel arrived at trial 27 minutes late because he had been attempting to obtain a postponement
of the trial by seeking a writ from the Supreme Court.
Granting the defendants a new trial, the Court stated:
The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when a defendant fails to plead
or otherwise defend an action. In such circumstances its use is practical and salutary. . . . This
is not a case where the defendants had failed
to defend. 411 P.2d at 130-31.
In Bunting Tractor Co. Inc. v. Emmett D. Ford
Contractors, Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 (1954),
the plaintiff failed to file a non-resident cost bond
within one month after demand, but procured a bond
before a motion to dismiss was filed. The Court reversed a dismissal with prejudice because the mere
"deviation from form and procedure shall not work a
forfeiture of substantive rights/' 272 P.2d at 192. The
dismissal of the plaintiff's case in the instant appeal
was not based upon a mere technical default, but rather,
was founded upon the complete and inexplicable failure
of the plaintiff to fulfill the obligation of prosecuting
an action with reasonable diligence.
The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of the
contention that the court erred in refusing to allow the
plaintiff an opportunity of proceeding on the date of
15
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trial are wholly inapplicable because the trial court
correctly determined that the plaintiff could not have
proved a case without expert testimony. In light of that
finding, the trial court clearly did not deny the plaintiff any opportunity that had not already been forfeited by neglect.
The propriety of the dismissal for failure to prosecute in this case is clearly illustrated by the closely
analogous case of Baker v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d
195 (1964). In Baker, the plaintiff sought a continuance on the grounds that the plaintiff was absent from
the state due to illness and that an expert witness was
on vacation and therefore unavailable. The trial court
denied the motion and, since the defendant was ready
for trial, the court dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal and observed no showing of any diligence as
to why the expert witness had not been subpoenaed,
why his deposition had not been taken prior to trial
and, finally, found no evidence as to the facts to which
the expert witness would testify. Affirming the dismissal, the Court stated:
Although plaintiff characterizes the action of
the trial judge as "arbitrary and unprecedented," it would seem to us that the ruling
made by the trial court resulted from the lack
of diligence in the prosecution of the case by
plaintiff. Not only is there not a showing of any
clear abuse of discretion, but, on the contrary,
we believe the action of the trial court was a
proper exercise of its judicial discretion. 396
P.2d at 197. (Emphasis added).
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the Court affirmed a dismissal for failure to prosecute and, in so doing, cited
Baker with approval. In Brasher Motor, the Court concluded as it should in this case :
We believe and hold that in the instant case the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, but on
the contrary acted with judicial propriety looking to the interests of all litigants and in promoting their causes with reasonable dispatch, —
certainly in preventing indiscriminate jostling
and clogging of the court calendars. 461 P.2d at
465.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial judge to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute is eminently justified and wholly appropriate in light of the record and
the intent of the rules of civil procedure. In order to
protect the rights of all litigants to a resolution of
their conflicts with reasonable dispatch, the Court must
insist that a plaintiff prepare and prosecute his case
with due diligence and care.
In the instant case, the trial judge exercised appropriate and sound discretion in determining that the
plaintiff failed to fulfill the obligation owed to the
court and to the parties of adequately prosecuting and
preparing the case for final adjudication. The court
below properly refused to condone the inexplicable and
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total lack of initiative and care in prosecuting the claim
against this defendant and correctly dismissed the case.
The Court should affirm the order of dismissal entered by the trial court.
Bespectfully submitted,
WOKSLEY, SNOW &
CHEISTENSBN
By John H. Snow
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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